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Introduction
Under present United States intellectual property law, clothing
design is not protected by federal copyright, trademark/trade dress,
or patent law, nor is it protected by any state intellectual property
regime. Certain aspects of clothing are capable of being protected -
a logo under trademark law, a non-useful decoration that is attached
to a piece of clothing under copyright law - but currently the entire
garment itself (sometimes referred to as a "fashion work") can be
copied and distributed at will. Indeed, current United States law
explicitly sanctions fashion design piracy; some courts have even
deemed it a "right" necessary to the avoidance of a monopoly on
clothing designs. As a result of this right, the cost to original creators
of designs by pirates runs to the hundreds of millions of dollars per
year.' This is even more than the piracy of sound recordings,2 whose
industry can claim copyright protection and polices its rights in a
draconian fashion.
To try to deal with design piracy, the fashion industry has come
up with various ways to protect itself, including attempting to expand
the doctrine of trade dress protection to garments. This strategy,
however, was hamstrung by a unanimous United States Supreme
Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.3 In addition,
the fashion industry has repeatedly attempted to change the
copyright statute (approximately 74 attempts since 1910, as of 1983'),
employed aggressive advertising, marketing, and use of logos to build
customer identification and desire, and used import bans and quotas
on foreign-manufactured garments. However, these remedies have
had varying degrees of success and still do not address the main
1. To give an example of the damage that wellorganized design pirates can do,
one major pirate has been attributed with $50 million in annual revenue from its knockoff
sales, and another with $200 million. Peter K. Schalestock, Student Author, Forms of
Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims Can Use Existing Copyright Law, 21 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 113,114 (1997).
2. The Recording Industry Association of America estimates that the amount of
money lost to sound recording piracy is $4.5 billion a year. Recording Indus. Assn. Am.,
The Effects of Sound Recording Piracy <http://www.riaa.org/Protect-Campaign-3.cfm>
(accessed Apr. 24, 2001).
3. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
4. Rocky Schmidt, Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design
Piracy, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 861, 864-65 (1983). Perhaps out of exhaustion in the industry,
since 1984 there have been no legislative attempts to amend the Copyright Act to include
fashion design. The two bills that were introduced to amend the Act to cover industrial
designs of useful articles, H.R. 902, 101st Cong. (1989) and H.R. 1790, 102nd Cong.
(1991), specifically exempted "designs composed of three-dimensional features of shape
and surface with respect to ... apparel."
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problem: the time and creativity that a designer invests in a new
design are appropriated by free riders, who saturate the market for
the design with cheaper, lower quality copies, sometimes bringing the
design to market before the original. Some firms, such as ABS,
openly and notoriously build their reputations on copying the haute
couture creations of major designers and rushing cheap imitations to
market literally overnight. The head of ABS, Allen B. Schwartz, has
admitted that he will watch fashion events such as the Academy
Awards telecast, sketch the dresses that the stars parade down the
red carpet, and "the next day decide which of the gowns will be
'adapted' or 'interpreted."' 5
In any other artistic field, this shameless wholesale copying
would be unthinkable. Forgers of the visual arts and pirates of sound
recordings and motion pictures receive criminal as well as civil
penalties for their endeavors. Protection for fashion works through
copyright and other methods, including moral and neighboring rights,
without the creation of monopolies or the stifling of competition,
exists in other countries in which fashion is a large sector of the
economy, such as France and the United Kingdom.' Given the
lucrative nature of the United States fashion industry7 and its
increasingly high profile in people's daily lives,8 one would think that
Congress would be happy to give it some protection. In fact, given
the national treatment provisions of the Berne Convention and
TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), 9
Congress may not be able to consider fashion design protection
merely at its whim for much longer - our current position as one of
5. See Cynthia Robins, Star Powered, S.F. Chron. E7 (Mar. 13, 2000).
6. See e.g. Copyright Act, 3 Eliz. 2, c. 5, §§ 3(1), 48(1) (1956) (Eng.) (United
Kingdom protects garment design as long as it can be related back to a copyright
drawing); Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (France), item 18, at 1-3 (UNESCO
2000) (Since 1952, French copyright law has protected garment designs without any
showing of originality.).
7. According to the 1997 Economic Census, retail apparel sales in the United
States in 1997 were $136,397,645,000. Retail Trade, 1997 Economic Census of the United
States 13 (Mar. 2000).
8. Fashion itself has become almost a separate form of entertainment, although its
rise to prominence has been because of the incredible expansion of the film and recording
industry and the public's fascination with their stars. Any major film opening or industry
awards ceremony is now a fashion show: many people tune in to the Academy Awards
telecast solely to see what the stars are wearing. Indeed, the first question that Melissa
and Joan Rivers ask during the stars' entrance on the red carpet is who designed the
outfits they are wearing. Celebrities shout designers' names like greetings to the crowd.
9. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July
24, 1971 (Paris Text), art. 5; see also WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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the few countries with a major intellectual property law regime that
does not protect fashion works violates the terms of these treaties.
However, current protection of fashion design" in the United States
through traditional intellectual property law is at an impasse.
Yet, there could be a way to get around it. The common law
doctrine of the right of publicity or personality, which arises in most
states out of the tort of invasion of privacy and which is a strong body
of law in jurisdictions dealing with the entertainment industry such as
California and the Ninth Circuit, could potentially be applied to
haute couture.1 I will focus on haute couture because it is the most
innovative area of fashion design and is closer to what is generally
considered "art" than everyday pr~t-a-porter clothing. Also, because
of its high price'2 the potential counter-arguments that protection of
fashion design would diminish the amount of choice in clothing styles
that ordinary consumers have would be dealt with, since haute
couture is a small sector of the fashion market.
The right of publicity currently allows celebrities - mostly
musicians, singers and actors - to protect against the unauthorized
appropriation not only of their physical image but also of the overall
projection of their performing style, the "essence" of their fame.
Under this regime, a designer would have a tort action against a
design pirate for misappropriation of identity or intrusion on his or
her right of publicity, as this is physically expressed in the design and
ethos of a couturier garment. Protection for high fashion under a
right of publicity would serve two purposes: (a) the protection of the
commercial value of a designer's services and reputation, and (b) the
protection of the artistic value of the creations. On this latter point,
the right of publicity is one of the closest things that United States
law presently has to European moral or neighboring rights law, and
application of the doctrine could potentially bring us into full
national treatment compliance with TRIPS and the Berne
Convention.
This paper will first discuss the history of the non-protection of
fashion design in the United States, looking at copyright,
10. 1 will use the terms "fashion design" and "fashion work" to refer to an entire
garment.
11. Haute couture, literally "high tailoring" in French, refers to handmade clothing,
fitted to the client's measurements and styled according to her taste. The result is a
gorgeous, unique garment, considered an example of fashion at its most elevated art form.
See The Grand French Haute Couture Houses <http://www.elegantlifestyle.com/
haute_couture.htm> (accessed Apr. 27, 2001).
12. The average price of a haute couture garment made in one of the French houses
is $16,000-20,000. Id.
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trademark/trade dress, and design patent law. Then, an overview of
the right of publicity and its traditional application in the performing
arts is given, followed by an application of the right of publicity
doctrine to the protection of haute couture design. Finally, the paper
examines how the right of publicity can overcome federal preemption
and antitrust objections in order to fit within the present United
States intellectual property regime.
I
Everyone's Wearing the Emperor's Clothes:
How United States Copyright, Trademark/Trade Dress, and
Patent Law Do Not Protect Fashion Design
A. Copyright
Clothing has never been protected under federal copyright law.
Although the cases and Congressional hearings on clothing design
protection do not indicate any judicial or legislative doubt about the
creative nature of fashion, what has trumped in-depth consideration
of the time, 3 energy and aesthetic genius required to be a leading
fashion designer has been the conclusion that all clothing is a "useful
article" and therefore not protected by copyright. Never mind that
useful articles, such as aesthetically designed, mass-market teakettles
created for Target, or lamps with statuettes for bases,14 are granted
copyrights every day. 5 Never mind that, with the commodification of
the world's largest entertainment industry, the United States has
made art's traditional "use" - to please and entertain - incredibly
lucrative yet simultaneously more accessible to people of all income
levels. Clothing, even zany runway creations," is useful because it
keeps us from going naked, protects us from the elements and signals
our station in society. It is useful because everyone needs it every
day.
13. About 100-150 hours of manual work are required to make a day outfit such as
a suit. For an evening gown, the time investment is closer to 1000 hours, even more if
there is extensive embroidery involved. See id.
14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
15. Although for these types of "useful" (in the everyday sense of the word) articles
to receive copyright protection, they must survive analysis under the conceptual
separability doctrine, in which only those aspects of the object that are artistic beyond the
object's functional qualities are granted protection. See generally id.
16. For example, in Alexander McQueen's runway show during London's Fashion
Week, 2001, this designer sent out one model wearing a skirt covered with mussel shells
and another wearing a large castle made of wood perched on her shoulder. Larissa
MacFarquhar, The Mad Muse of Waterloo, The New Yorker 100, 103 (Mar. 19, 2001).
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The Copyright Act 7 grants only limited protection to useful
articles. Section 101 of the statute defines useful articles as "having
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information."' 8 The design of a
useful article is granted protection as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work "only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."' 9 Moreover, the exclusive
right granted in Section 106 to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work includes the right to reproduce the work in
useful or non-useful articles." This does not give the owner of a
copyright in a work that portrays a useful article any greater or lesser
rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful
article than those afforded to such works under the Copyright Act,
other statutes, and existing court decisions.2' What this means is that
copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work is not affected if
the work is employed as the design of a useful article; however, the
intent of Congress and the Register of Copyrights is not to extend
copyright protection to the manufacture of useful articles
themselves.2 Thus, holding a copyright in the drawing of a design for
a dress does not give the artist the exclusive right to make dresses of
the same design.
Because a fashion work is meant to turn an everyday article into
an artistic whole, it has been impossible, thus far, to fit fashion into
this limited useful article protection. Creative seekers of protection
have tried unsuccessfully to argue that a Halloween costume, for
instance, is not a useful article but a "soft sculpture."'23 After all, what
is "useful," in the regular sense of the word, about dressing as a
stegosaurus? An uncreative court held that costumes are indeed
useful articles because they are still, essentially, clothing.24
Subsequently, the Copyright Office issued a cryptic Policy Decision
on the Registrability of Costume Designs, declaring that masks are
17. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2001).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
19. Id. This definition incorporates the holding in Mazer, 347 U.S. 201, discussed
below. Haute couture would seem to fit under this definition quite well.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a).
21. Id. § 113(b).
22. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (Sept. 3, 1976).
23. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
24. Id. at 456.
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registrable as pictorial or sculptural works.25 Nevertheless, the Policy
Decision stated that costumes are to be treated as useful articles and
granted protection only upon a finding of separable artistic
authorship.26 The distinction between masks and costumes exists,
according to the Copyright Office, because masks "generally portray
their own appearance" and, therefore, fall outside the definition of a
useful article, while costumes "serve a dual purpose of clothing the
body and portraying their appearance. Since clothing the body serves
as a useful function, costumes fall within the literal definition of
useful article."27 When faced with this level of obtuse hair-splitting
about the definition of "useful," it is no wonder that lobbyists have
been unsuccessful in their 73 attempts since 1914 to amend the
Copyright Act to include fashion design.28
Meanwhile, designers have pursued protection through the
courts. The first modern challenge to the lack of copyright protection
given to clothing arose in Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp.29 in
which the creator of hand-painted silk fabric, outraged that his
competitor was copying his best-selling designs and undercutting his
price on the market, brought suit in the Second Circuit for
commercial injury caused by unfair competition." The plaintiff
sought protection for his designs only during the eight- or nine-month
"season" during which such designs catch the public eye.31 Judge
Learned Hand described the short-lived nature of the silks'
popularity and stressed the short marketing time frame under which
the plaintiff operated.32 He further stressed how neither copyright nor
design patent protection was available to the fabric, making it "easy
for any one to copy such [designs] as prove successful, and the
plaintiff, which is put to much ingenuity and expense in fabricating
them, finds itself without protection of any sort for its pains."33
Nevertheless, Judge Hand perceived a slippery slope in offering
protection to designs only during their season of fashionability and
held that, in the absence of explicit statutory or common law
protection, "a man's property is limited to the chattels which embody
25. 56 Fed. Reg. 56530, 56532 (Nov. 5, 1991).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 865.
29. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
30. Id. at 279.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
20011 APPLYING RIGHT OF PUBLICITY To FASHION DESIGN
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure."34 Only
Congress could grant protection against the imitation of an object,
through either the Copyright Act or patent laws, and thereby create a
monopoly in its design.35 Except for non-functional features of a
creation, people are free to copy the original.36 Otherwise, granting a
monopoly over a useful article without congressional authority would
be unconstitutional.
The next main case dealing with the intersection of art and
useful articles was Mazer v. Stein.38 There, the plaintiff manufactured
lamps whose base consisted of a statue of a Balinese dancer; the
statue had been registered for copyright as "a work of art."39 The
defendant copied both the lamp and the base."0 When the plaintiff
brought suit for copyright infringement, the defendant responded by
saying that copyright protection could not be extended to the base
statue because it was a useful article - although it was highly
decorative, it was still a lamp base and therefore useful." The
Supreme Court held that a work of art that had been incorporated
into the design of a useful article could indeed be copyrighted, and
that such a work does not lose copyright protection upon being
embodied in the useful article. The Court went on to state that the
following factors make no difference for this analysis: (1) the
potential availability of design patent protection for the same subject
matter; (2) the artist's intention as to the commercial application and
mass production of the design; (3) the aesthetic value of the design,
or its total lack thereof; and (4) the fact that the design, in its useful
embodiment, was mass-produced and merchandised commercially on
a nationwide scale. 3
Although the Mazer court language could be construed as
granting protection to original clothing designs, subsequent decisions
have held that it does not." The rule laid down by Judge Hand in
34. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 281.
36. Id. at 280.
37. Id.
38. 347 U.S. 201.
39. Id. at 202.
40. Id. at 203.
41. Id. at 205.
42. Id. at 217.
43. Id. at 217-18.
44. See e.g. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989);
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Whimsicality, Inc. v. Maison
Joseph Battat, Ltee, et al., 27 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Cheney Brothers has persisted, and only fashion designs that can be
identified separately from the fashion work itself can receive a
copyright; the overall configuration of the utilitarian object is not
protected.45 Since a fashion work is an entire piece of clothing that
consists of a creative whole, it has been deemed too conceptually
difficult to separate out its copyrightable aspects from its utilitarian
46
ones.
Besides citing the useful nature of clothing as a barrier to
copyright protection, Congress and the courts fear that extending
copyright protection to fashion would lay the groundwork for
monopolies in the apparel market. 7 Since exclusive use of a
copyrighted article is inherent in the grant of protection,48 holders of
a copyright in garment designs would be able to prevent use of their
creations entirely, or license the use of their designs on potentially
onerous terms.49 Courts have expressed particular concern that
protection for fashion designs would price lower-income consumers
out of the market for the newest trends, and that design piracy is
therefore a socially desirable form of competition."0 Given all of these
concerns, it appears that copyright protection for fashion works is
still just a dream, despite some admirable suggestions for reform that
would balance the interests of designers and consumers. 1
B. Trademark and Trade Dress
Protection of fashion design under trademark and trade dress
law has been another route designers have used to mitigate the flood
of copies of their works. However, this area of intellectual property
law has proven ineffective in preventing copying of an entire
garment." Moreover, the United States Supreme Court dealtprotection via trade dress theory a setback in 2000 when it narrowly
45. See generally S. Priya Bharathi, Student Author, There Is More Than One Way
to Skin a Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion
Works, 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1667, 1678 (1996).
46. See id.
47. Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 866.
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
49. Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 866-67.
50. See Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940), affd, 312
U.S. 469 (1941); see also Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 281.
51. See Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 875-80 (arguing for a special copyright for garment
designs, available for one year and subject to a compulsory license for this term,
beginning as soon as the design is available to the public).
52. See generally Knitwares Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that trade dress protection is only available for designs that serve as an identifier of
the designer).
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construed its own previous rulings on the scope of trade dress and
denied a children's clothing maker protection for its garments. 3 As
the law stands currently, trademark and trade dress theory offer only
limited solace to designers of couture fashion.
Trademark law has been successful in protecting logos, names,
and other emblems that are placed on garments (and accessories),54
but cannot be applied to an entire garment, unless the entire garment
meets the criteria for protection under the Lanham Act55 or state
trademark law. In order to receive a trademark or trade dress
protection for an entire garment, the garment must be either
inherently distinctive - that is, its intrinsic nature serves to identify
its particular source - or it must acquire distinctiveness through
secondary meaning - that is, its significance is to identify the
product's source rather than the product itself. 6 Courts often rely on
consumer surveys and expert testimony to determine whether a mark
or trade dress has acquired secondary meaning.7 They also consider a
number of non-exclusive factors,58 but above all the most important
ingredient in the acquisition of secondary meaning is the time the
product spends on the market building up consumer recognition of its
source.
59
Generally, an entire garment is not considered inherently
distinctive in and of itself such that it identifies its particular source
because the design of the garment is limited in its possible shapes by
the form of the human body." The facets of the garment that help us
identify who designed it - the mussel shells for Alexander
McQueen, bold stripes for Sonia Rykiel, clean, simple lines for
Calvin Klein - are usually separable from the physical dress itself
(and, in Sonia Rykiel's case, perhaps eligible for a trademark on their
own). Additionally, because it takes time on the market for a mark to
build up secondary meaning - usually longer than the three-month
season that garments are marketable due to the ephemeral nature of
style" - it is, therefore, nearly impossible for a garment itself to
53. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. 205.
54. Id. at 209.
55. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2001) (Lanham Act, § 43(a)).
56. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n. 11
(1982).
57. See Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1681.
58. The main secondary meaning factors are discussed in more detail below at
pages 111-13. See infra nn. 69-81 and accompanying text.
59. See Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1682.
60. Id. at 1683.
61. See Schmidt, supra n. 4, at n. 59.
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acquire it.
Trade dress law would appear to be more conducive to the
protection of fashion works. Trade dress is a "hybrid of trademark
law and unfair competition,"'62 traditionally referring to a product's
packaging,63 but now encompassing a product's overall image, its
"design and appearance. '" 6' This new definition includes the product's
shape, color, graphics, packaging, and label. Courts have found that
a china pattern, a fishing reel design, a restaurant's ambience, a
television commercial's theme, and a rock group's musical
performance style, among other things, may be protected under trade
dress.66 Trade dress, like trademark law, is concerned with consumer
confusion about a product's source or affiliation and is governed by
the Lanham Act.67 To claim protection, a plaintiff must offer factual
proof that the trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired
secondary meaning, and that a defendant's competing product is
"confusingly similar" to the plaintiff's.'
Unlike trademark law, trade dress' focus on a product's "look
and feel" appears to make it readily applicable to fashion design
protection. 69 The Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc. appeared to support this application by holding that
there was no basis in the Lanham Act for treating inherently
distinctive trade dress differently from inherently distinctive verbal
or symbolic trademarks," and that requiring secondary meaning for
inherently distinctive trade dress undermined the Lanham Act's
purposes in that it would hinder a producer's ability to improve or
maintain its competitive position, or to enter the market at all.7" By
clearing up the conflict among the circuit courts regarding whether
secondary meaning was an alternative or additional requirement to a
62. Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1668 (quoting Leslie J. Hagin, Student Author, A
Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Pro-
posal for Folding Fashion Works into the U.S. Copyright Regime, 26 Tex. Intl. L.J. 341,
358 (1991)).
63. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir.
1995) (quoting Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir.
1995)).
64. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n. 1 (1992).
65. See Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1679.
66. See id. at 1680 nn. 104-08.
67. See id. at 1679.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1681 nn. 115-16.
69. See generally Bharathi, supra n. 45 (applying trade dress law and the rule from
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763 to the protection of fashion design).
70. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774.
71. Id.
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showing of inherent distinctiveness, Two Pesos seemingly cleared the
way for its application to haute couture fashion design, since these
garments are usually inherently distinctive enough for consumers to
identify the garment with its source, the designer, without the burden
of having to be on the market for a significant period to build up
secondary meaning.
However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc." limited the Two Pesos rule to
trade dress, not product design. Wal-Mart Stores held that, to be
protected under the Lanham Act, an unregistered product design will
be considered distinctive (and therefore eligible for trade dress
protection) only upon a showing of secondary meaning.73 In this case,
the "product design" related to one-piece, seersucker children's
outfits decorated with appliques of hearts, flowers, and fruit,
designed by Samara Brothers and sold under contract to stores such
as JCPenney.74 Wal-Mart sent photographs of Samara Brothers'
garments to its supplier and requested copies of the garments.75 Wal-
Mart then sold the knockoffs at a price lower than Samara Brothers'
garments' price at JCPenney's, generating $1.15 million in gross
profits.76 Samara Brothers was notified of the knockoffs' existence
when a buyer for JCPenney's complained that she had seen what she
thought were Samara Brothers garments on sale at Wal-Mart for less
than what JCPenney's "was allowed to charge under its contract with
Samara [Brothers]. 77 The District Court jury found for Samara
Brothers, and both the District Court and the Second Circuit denied
Wal-Mart's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 8
Nevertheless, despite Wal-Mart's blatant appropriation of the
"look and feel" of Samara Brothers' clothing and the undercutting of
its price, the Supreme Court found that producers will supposedly be
adequately protected if courts require a showing of secondary
meaning for product design, not product packaging, because design
can be protected by other areas of the law (copyright and design
patent). 79 The Court agreed that requiring secondary meaning and
72. 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
73. Id. at 216.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 214. It did not seem to matter to the Supreme Court that those aspects of
Samara Brothers' outfits that could receive copyright protection - the heart/fruit/flower
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drawing a distinction between this case and Two Pesos would force
courts to "draw difficult lines between product-design and product-
packaging trade dress" and that there would be some "hard cases on
the margin," such as glass Coca-Cola bottles.' However, in the event
of close cases the Court urged courts to "err on the side of caution
and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby
requiring secondary meaning."8' Once again, an avenue of protection
for clothing design was foreclosed, since the short timeframe of
clothing's marketability more or less precludes its attaining a
secondary meaning until the item is no longer "in fashion," at which
point a suit to protect it would be meaningless.
C. Design Patent
United States design patent law' grants protection to "new,
original and ornamental design[s] for an article of manufacture."83
The purpose of design patents is to protect elements that give a
"distinctive appearance" to articles of manufacture, in either their
configuration or ornamentation.8' At first glance it would appear that
garment designs would fit well within the design patent schema.
However, to be eligible for a design patent a garment design would
have to meet the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness,
originality, be ornamental, and meet the test of invention.85 Courts
have consistently held that garment designs do not meet these
requirements.86
Furthermore, design patent law imposes a time schedule that
would make it impossible for fashion design to qualify for a design
patent, even if the patent law were amended to cover garments.87 The
process of acquiring a patent is lengthy, mostly because the prior art
search, which determines whether the patentability requirements
appliques - were already covered; the problem lay not in Wal-Mart's appropriation of
the appliques but the entire piece of clothing. See id. at 207-13. Consumers were not just
purchasing the appliques; they were purchasing the outfit that was enhanced and made
more aesthetic by the appliques. See id. at 213-14. The outfit was what drove Wal-Mart's
$1.15 million in gross profits. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 215.
81. Id.
82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (2001).
83. Id. § 171.
84. Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 867.
85. Id. at 867.
86. Id. at 867-68 n. 43 (listing cases holding that garment designs do not meet the
requirements of patentability).
87. Id. at 868.
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have been met, may take several years to complete." Again, since a
fashion work's fashionability life span is usually only three months
long, protection for it via a design patent would come too late, if ever.
II
Our Clothing, Our Selves: How the Right of Publicity Could
Protect Haute Couture Fashion Design
So far we have seen how the traditional avenues of intellectual
property law do not adequately protect clothing design. Presently,
designers can build and keep their reputations not via a protective
period for their creative expressions, but by constantly producing
new designs and creating customer desire and loyalty through
advertising and marketing. This process is extremely expensive, time-
consuming, 9 and frustrating when one knows that Allen B. Schwartz,
the couture knock-off king, is hovering over his television preparing
copies of your most innovative looks as celebrities or models parade
them down the runway.' You, the designer, have put yourself into
these designs - what can you do?
The answer may lie in the very fact that designers do put
themselves into their designs - the clothing they create expresses
their ethos, their views on aesthetics, popular culture and beauty,
which is what they wish to convey to the world and what they believe
will sell. In other words, clothing embodies fashion designers' public
projections of themselves and their identities. In the fashion world,
this expression of a designer's identity is seen most readily in her
haute couture designs: the made-to-order, very expensive creations in
which a designer can experiment with cut, shape, fabric, and color;
the creations that people love to contemplate but few actually wear.
Haute couture can be crazy or classic, but, above all, it is the essence
and epitome of creativity in fashion design.
It is clear that both designers and the public consider haute
88. Id.
89. An original designer's costs for design of a new line is about 2-4% of sales.
There are five seasons per year in the fashion world for which designers must generate
new lines. Id. at n. 18-19.
90. Schwartz even names his knockoffs for the celebrity who was wearing the
original; for instance, the pink, spaghetti strap Ralph Lauren dress that Gwyneth Paltrow
wore when she accepted her Academy Award for Best Actress in 1999 was reincarnated
as "Gwyneth," on sale at department stores for about $250. ABS sold 10,000 copies of
"Gwyneth." See Claire Bickley, Knock-Off the Oscar Rack, Toronto Sun 06 (Mar. 26,
2001).
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couture to be art.91 Millions of people watch television broadcasts of
awards shows such as the Academy Awards in order to ponder and
critique the outfits that the celebrities wear; millions consume
magazines from Vogue to People in order to admire the photographs
of and advertisements for the clothing depicted therein. Two of the
most successful blockbuster museum exhibitions in New York City in
the past decade were the Gianni Versace exhibit at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art's Costume Institute in 1997, and the Giorgio Armani
exhibit at the Guggenheim Museum in 2000. The genius, in the
Romantic spirit of the term, that is readily apparent in haute couture
has appeared to have escaped only the consciousness of judges and
Congresspersons, who insist on classifying it as "useful" because it
prevents people from being naked92 and may keep them warm.
Because designers put themselves into their clothing designs, the
body of United States law that may offer protection against the
unlicensed copying of haute couture is the right of publicity.
A. An Overview of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity arose out of the invasion of privacy torts,
particularly, invasion of privacy based on misappropriation of
identity, that stemmed from Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis'
seminal law review article. Although its germ was in the
misappropriation of identity tort, which seeks to compensate an
individual for the emotional distress she suffered from an
unauthorized use of her identity, the right of publicity aims at
providing redress for "the economic harms that accompany the
unauthorized exploitation of an [individual's persona]."'9 The right of
publicity arose in the 1950s, as "celebrity," as we understand the
term, quickly became a commodity, spread by the advance of various
91. According to the Versace website, Versace's couture line, Atelier Versace,
"represents the closest link between Versace and art as each piece is individually tailored
and unique." Versace Atelier <http://www.versace.com/atelier> (accessed Apr. 23, 2001).
92. Although in the case of the dress by Chanel that Jennifer Lopez wore to make
her presentation at the 2001 Academy Awards, it can also enhance the fact that we are
all, in the words of comedienne Rita Rudner, Naked Beneath My Clothes: Takes of a
Revealing Nature (Penguin Audiobooks 1992).
93. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890). The four torts that arose from the right to privacy are (1) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false
light portrayals; and (4) the misappropriation of an individual's name or likeness. See W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 117 at 849-68 (5th ed.
1984).
94. Steven M. Fleischer, The Right of Publicity: Preventing an Identity Crisis, 27 N.
Ky. L. Rev. 985, 988 (2000).
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media technologies, including films and television. Courts began to
recognize the right of publicity as a property-based cause of action,
separate from the emotional distress-based actions, that compensated
an individual for the impermissible use of her identity.95 Eventually,
in the landmark case Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.,6 the doctrine shed the need for a showing of emotional
injury, focusing instead on the investment that celebrities make in the
economic viability of their public identities.97
Since the 1950s, the right of publicity has become an established
doctrine in most jurisdictions,98 receiving federal recognition in 1977, 9
and becoming a well-developed body of law in jurisdictions that are
host to large sectors of the United States entertainment industry,
specifically the Ninth Circuit. This circuit has applied the doctrine
expansively, in a way that could help with its use in the protection of
haute couture in four cases - Motschenbacher v. R.. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,'O° Midler v. Ford Motor Co., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,102
and White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc."°3
In Motschenbacher, the plaintiff, a famous race car driver, sued
R. J. Reynolds for misappropriation of his name, likeness, personality
and endorsement when the latter used a photograph of
Motschenbacher's racing car in an advertisement for Winston
cigarettes. ' Motschenbacher's car was decorated distinctively and
was immediately recognizable to followers of his sport.1"5 R. J.
Reynolds' advertising agent incorporated a stock photograph of the
car into the advertisement, altering the car's number, adding a spoiler
and the word "Winston" to it, but otherwise making no changes to
95. Id. at 989.
96. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
97. Fleischer, supra n. 94, at 989. Haelen Laboratory was the first case to separate
explicitly the emotional aspects from the economic aspects of the tort, and to coin the
term "right of publicity." 202 F.2d 866 (holding that individuals have a cognizable interest
in the use of their identities through commercial exploitation, and this interest can be
violated with or without attendant emotional injury).
98. Fleischer, supra n. 94, at 991.
99. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-78 (1977) (holding
that the right of publicity is a valid cause of action, that the right can trump the First
Amendment in certain situations, and that the right can encompass an entertainer's entire
act).
100. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
101. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992).
104. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822.
105. Id.
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the car's overall appearance1" Motschenbacher was driving the car in
this particular photograph, though his facial features were not
visible. 7 Several fans and colleagues recognized the car when the ads
ran on television and inferred that Motschenbacher was sponsored by
Winston cigarettes."°8 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of R. J. Reynolds, since the car's number was changed and
Motschenbacher himself could not be discerned in the photograph.1"
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized the specific economic
nature of the damages inflicted when an identity that has a
commercial value is appropriated, stating, "It would be wholly
unrealistic to deny that a name, likeness, or other attribute of identity
can have commercial value.""0 Moving away from previous
California invasion of privacy decisions that emphasized mental or
emotional damages to the plaintiff, the court concluded that
the California appellate courts would, in a case such as this
one, afford legal protection to an individual's proprietary in-
terest in his own identity. We need not decide whether they
would do so under the rubric of 'privacy,' 'property,' or
'publicity"; we only determine that they would recognize
such an interest and protect it."'
The court concluded that, although Motschenbacher's likeness
was not recognizable in the commercial, the distinctive markings of
the car, which more or less was the plaintiff's identity during races,
could (and did) lead to people inferring that he was endorsing
Winston cigarettes."2
In Midler, the actress/singer Bette Midler sued Ford for
exploiting her voice without her consent."3 Ford's advertising agency,
co-defendant Young & Rubicam, had contacted Midler's manager
regarding her singing a song as part of a new advertising campaign."'
Since Midler did not do commercials, her manager declined the
request."5 Young & Rubicam then sought out Ula Hedwig, who had
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 823.
110. Id. at 821, 825 n. 10.
111. Id. at 825-26 (footnotes omitted).
112. Id. at 827.
113. 849 F.2d at 461-62.
114. Id. at 461.
115. Id.
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been a backup singer for Midler for ten years, to sing the song,
replicating Midler's sound and performance style as closely as
possible."6 Ford then aired the advertisement; people affiliated with
both Midler and Hedwig noted that the song sounded "exactly" like
Midler's original version."7 Because Young & Rubicam had a license
from the song's copyright holder regarding its use, the sole issue in
the suit was the protection of Midler's voice.118 Although the district
court described Ford's and Young & Rubicam's conduct as theft, it
granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that it
could find no legal principle preventing imitation of Midler's voice."'
The Ninth Circuit found that because a voice cannot be
copyrighted, federal copyright law did not preempt her claim: "[w]hat
is put forward as protectable here is more personal than any work of
authorship.""12 Furthermore, because Midler as a rule did not do
commercials, there was no unfair competition by the defendants with
the market for her voice. 2' AlSo, California's misappropriation of
identity statute22 could not help her because the commercials did not
use her name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness within the
statute's meaning.'23 However, analogizing from Motschenbacher, the
court found that the defendants had appropriated the "attributes" of
Midler's identity.'24 Just as the advertisement in Motschenbacher
suggested that he was in it, and therefore affiliated with the
defendant's product, the Ford ad suggested that Midler was affiliated
with their product by emphasizing "signs and symbols" associated
with her.'25 Because a voice, especially that of a renowned singer, is a
unique identifier in which the singer "manifests herself[,] ... [t]o
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity.' 26 The court went on
to limit its holding to protecting "a distinctive voice of a professional
singer" that is "widely known and is deliberately imitated" from
appropriation, and that such appropriation is a taking of the singer's
identity. 27
116. Id.
117. Id. at 462.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 463.
122. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 2001).
123. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 463-64.
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Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. dealt with a similar issue as Midler -
unauthorized appropriation of a singer's voice via use of a sound-
alike."' The singer, Tom Waits, had consistently maintained a policy
of not endorsing products throughout his career, and made this policy
known to the public through various magazine, radio, and newspaper
interviews, saying that, in his view, endorsement detracts from a
musical artist's integrity.9 Frito-Lay, wishing to use the tune of one
of Waits' songs with new lyrics that reflected the wordplay and
rhyming of the original in a radio advertisement for SalsaRio
Doritos, found a singer who would be able to convey the "feeling" of
the song by singing it in Waits' gravelly style.3° Despite concerns by
some members of Frito-Lay's advertising agency, Tracy-Locke, about
the legal implications of running the ad, Frito-Lay nonetheless chose
to air it."'
Frito-Lay's main defense rested on its challenge to the continued
viability of Midler as good law in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,3' which
had affirmed and explained two earlier Supreme Court decisions,
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.'33 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting.3 4 Like the statute granting patent-like protection to boat
hull designs that was found to be preempted by federal patent law
because such designs were expressly excluded from the federal
scheme, so should a challenge to the use of an imitation of a singer's
voice be preempted by federal copyright law.' The Ninth Circuit
disagreed with Frito-Lay's reasoning, reminding it that the Supreme
Court specifically cautioned in Bonito Boats against reading Sears
and Compco for a "broad pre-emptive principle" and had backed
away from this kind of sweeping interpretation in decisions
subsequent to them.'36 Not only had the Supreme Court affirmed in
128. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096.
129. Id. at 1097.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1098.
132. 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that a Florida statute granting perpetual, patent-
like protection to boat hull designs, a type of article that was expressly excluded from
federal patent protection, was preempted by federal patent law because it directly
conflicted with the requirements and underlying policy of the federal patent scheme). See
infra, p. 126-27 for further discussion of federal preemption of state intellectual property
statutes.
133. 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding that publicly known design and utilitarian ideas -
here, the design of a floor lamp - are expressly unprotected by the federal patent law).
134. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
135. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099.
136. Id. (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165).
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Bonito Boats that the patent and copyright clauses of the
Constitution 37 do not automatically deprive states of the power to
adopt rules for the protection of intellectual property, the Court also
specifically recognized the states' authority to protect entertainers'
right of publicity in Zacchini."" Therefore, held the Ninth Circuit, the
entire line of cases dealing with federal preemption of state copyright
law up through Bonito Boats supported its holding in Midler.'3 9
Because Waits' voice is not copyrightable subject matter, his claim
for appropriation of his identity as embodied in his voice was not pre-
empted by federal copyright law, and the trial court correctly applied
the elements of voice misappropriation as laid out in Midler"' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Waits.'4'
The final case, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
expanded further the boundaries of the right of publicity and
appeared to cement the general theory of the right: that a celebrity's
investment in her public persona will be protected from
appropriation.'42 At issue in White was the use in a print ad for
Samsung VCRs of a robot wearing a blond wig and an evening gown
turning letters on a television game show set.'43 The robot, through its
hair and clothing, as well as the game board with its glowing letter
tiles that the robot turned, deliberately referred to the game show
"Wheel of Fortune" and its hostess, Vanna White.'" The ad was
captioned, "Longest Running Game Show, 2012 AD," drawing the
connection that both the Samsung VCR and "Wheel of Fortune"
would still be going strong at that date.'45 Although Vanna White
regularly endorsed various products, she was not consulted about the
Samsung ads (unlike other celebrities used in the campaign), nor was
she paid.'46 White sued under California's misappropriation of
identity statute, the common law right of publicity, and section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.' 7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on
summary judgment of her state statute and remanded her Lanham
137. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
138. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099 (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, discussed supra at
note 99).
139. Id. at 1100.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1112.
142. White, 1992 U.S App. LEXIS 19253.
143. Id. at *3.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Act and common law right of publicity claims."8 The following
discussion focuses on the court's analysis of the right of publicity
claim.
Samsung defended against White's right of publicity claim by
stressing that its advertisement had not used her name or likeness.'49
However, the court countered that Samsung had not considered the
Motschenbacher and Midler decisions and that a claim of injury to
one's right of publicity did not only mean a misappropriation of the
individual's name or likeness." ' The court emphasized that "[t]he
right of publicity does not require that appropriations of identity be
accomplished through particular means to be actionable," and that
"the specific means of appropriation are relevant only for
determining whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the
plaintiff's identity.. 5. Samsung had "directly implicated the
commercial interests which the right of publicity is designed to
protect" through its use of the robot-Vanna - how the appropriation
occurred is not important, but rather whether the defendant
appropriated. 2 Treating the means of appropriation as dispositive
would "eviscerate" the right and "fail to protect those plaintiffs most
in need of its protection... The identities of the most popular
celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but also
the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as
name, likeness, or voice." '53 Because the ad clearly referred to White
in the specific setting for which she is famous, and White alleged
appropriation of her identity, the court found that her claim should
not have been dismissed on summary judgment.'54
Motschenbacher, Midler, Waits, and White demonstrate how the
right of publicity has grown beyond the emotional injury requirement
of the original invasion of privacy tort to encompass not only a
celebrity's name, signature, or physical attributes, such as image or
actual voice, but also performance style and attributes. Furthermore,
it appears to survive some federal preemption issues, but survival in a
specific case will depend on the facts and the area of federal
intellectual property law under which a challenger claims
encroachment. Although the right of publicity has been explored
148. Id. at *5, *13, *19.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *8-*9.
151. Id. at *9.
152. Id. at *10.
153. Id. at *11.
154. Id. at *13.
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most deeply by the Ninth Circuit, other circuits are more or less in
accord with the expansive interpretation of the right.' Finally, with
the Supreme Court's blessing in Zacchini, it appears that the right of
publicity is ripe enough to be applied to other aspects of celebrity and
entertainment beyond the performing arts - specifically, designers
of haute couture.
B. Applying the Right of Publicity to Fashion Design
If a singer's performance style, a game show hostess' attire and
stance, a race car driver's car, and a phrase introducing an actor can
be deemed to be legally protected as extensions of an individual's
public identity, then why shouldn't a designer's style, as evinced in his
or her haute couture creations, be similarly protected? Let's see how
the right would work when applied to the case of a designer.
First, since the right of publicity is a personal tort, the designer,
not the corporation through which he or she markets creations,
would be the only one with standing to sue. In the case of deceased
designers, such as Coco Chanel, whose work is carried on by a head
designer at the corporations they founded,'56 either their heirs would
have standing (since the right of publicity is descended in certain
jurisdictions)'57 or the head designer would have standing as the
successor in interest to the right. It would make more sense for the
head designer to bring the suit, since the work being copied would
155. See e.g. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983) (holding that the defendant's marketing of its portable toilets under the brand name
"Here's Johnny," the phrase that was used each night on plaintiff Johnny Carson's
television show to introduce him, without Carson's permission, constituted an
impermissible appropriation of Carson's identity under the right of publicity); contra
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984) (holding that New York
does not recognize a common law right of publicity).
156. The head designer makes design decisions for the overall look of all products
the design house will produce, and often personally designs the couture items. Although
the head designer will be able to incorporate his or her own personal design traits into
works produced by the house, most of the products will continue to bear the qualities for
which the original designer became famous-for example, although Karl Lagerfeld has
taken over the artistic direction of the house of Chanel, the use of quilting, leather and
gold braided chains on handbags, and certain brightly colored, soft fabrics accented with
embroidery for suits carry on Coco Chanel's creative vision.
157. E.g. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prod, Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) (holding the right of publicity is distinct from the right of
privacy, and therefore descendible under Georgia law); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West
2001) (granting protection against the use of a deceased personality's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness on products or advertising, and granting possession of
this interest to the deceased's spouse, children, grandchildren, or registered successor in
interest); contra N.Y. Civ. Rights Laws § 50 (McKinney 2001) (right of publicity
actionable only by living person).
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really have been created by her, only incorporating traits that the
original designer created and that continue to live in the work made
by the present-day design house.
Second, the designer could sue for common law
misappropriation of the design traits that are the essence of his or her
work. The state common law publicity right is the applicable
doctrine, since most state right of publicity statutes refer specifically
(and exclusively) to name, likeness, signature, or voice.'58 The analysis
of the misappropriation would follow that in Midler and Waits:
whether the defendant deliberately imitated the designer's "voice,"
i.e., the embodiment of his design ethos, instead of his style, and
whether the designer's ethos was sufficiently distinctive and widely
known to give him a protected right in its use.159 The disputed design
traits would be those that are unique to the designer, that appear as a
theme throughout his work, that express his philosophy of aesthetics
and Weltanschauung.
Ultimately, the analysis of the traits would be similar to the
secondary meaning analysis for trade dress, that is, determining
whether purchasers of the fashions bearing the traits associate them
with the producer, the degree and manner of advertising of the traits,
the length and manner of use, and whether the use has been
exclusive.' 6 However, because the purpose of the action would be to
vindicate an individual creator's commercial interest in his
personality as it is expressed in his designs, the analysis would have to
go beyond the ordinary secondary meaning analysis into almost an
art historian's assessment of a particular artist's signature style.
Although useful, traditional tools of the secondary meaning analysis
such as consumer surveys would not be necessary because in order to
bring a successful suit under the right of publicity, one usually has to
be well known already. Any type of secondary meaning analysis
would be applied to the designer's fame, not to the individual works
whose misappropriation underlies the suit.
To give an example of how the traits could be discerned,
consider the couture evening dresses designed by the late Gianni
Versace (and his sister, heir and successor in interest to his design
house, Donatella Versace). Versace's dresses are heavily influenced
158. E.g. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 2001); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney
2001) (statutory right of publicity is only action available in New York).
159. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (following Midler, 849 F.2d at 462-63).
160. See Bharathi, supra n. 45, at 1681-82, (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell,
Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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by Classical mythology6' and art, employ long lines and bold colors
with delicate, flowing fabric, are often accented with oversized, metal
accoutrements, 62 and are deliberately revealing and provocative in
every sense of the word. His dresses are remarkably different from
one another, but are definitely unmistakable as Versace. Each detail
that makes them stand out as his probably could not be granted
trademark or trade dress status, but they contribute to his unique
imprimatur. The designs are embodiments of his bold, brash
personality; they are his performance style, attributes of his identity.
In analyzing the misappropriation of a Versace dress by a knockoff, a
court would look at what makes Versace Versace, via expert
testimony on and pictorial evidence of his collections and the
elements that have been present in his style more or less consistently
over time.
Third, the designer would sue copyists, such as Allen B.
Schwartz, who deliberately copy haute couture and create the same
thing, from inferior-quality fabric and other inputs, and sell it for
much less money.'63 The changes in fabric quality and color may
distinguish the knockoff, but it would be clear what the knockoff is
attempting to represent, as it was clear that the slightly altered race
car in the disputed Winston cigarette ad belonged to Lothar
Motschenbacher and was intended to refer to him.164 Although the
designer and the knockoff artist are not competing directly in the
same merchandise market, since consumers of ABS dresses are
usually not also consumers of Versace,65 they are competing in the
market for design talent and creativity. The reason knockoff artists
are successful is not because their creations possess their own artistic
vision, but because people consume them for the fact that they look
161. Indeed, his house's trademark is a gold-colored Medusa's head.
162. For example, the large gold safety pins that held together the left side of the
dress that model Elizabeth Hurley wore to the 1994 Academy Awards.
163. A Versace gown's price can be around $20,000. An ABS gown is usually around
$250.
164. The facts in Motschenbacher that the court found abhorrent are similar to
ABS's practice of naming the knocked-off gowns for the celebrities who wore the
originals, e.g., "Gwyneth" (for Gwyneth Paltrow), "Halle" (for Halle Berry), and
"Ashley" (for Ashley Judd). ABS by Allen Schwartz, Celebrity Collection <http://
www.absstyle.com> (accessed Apr. 23, 2001).
165. Upper middle-class consumers who could afford either an ABS gown or could
stretch for a Versace for a truly special occasion could make a difference. Moreover, in
markets for accessories such as shoes or handbags, there is probably a larger pool of
consumers who could purchase either the high-end designer items or the design knockoffs
(as opposed to counterfeits).
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like the originals."6 This is the entire point of the knockoff industry.
This is no different from Young & Rubicam's employing a Bette
Midler sound-alike to sing one of her songs when it could not employ
Midler herself (and paid the sound-alike much less for her services).
Fourth, the designer would seek damages in the amount of the
fair market value of his services as a designer.'67 Fair market value of
design services is a more accurate assessment of what is stolen when a
knockoff artist copies a couture designer than lost sales or profits,
since, as was discussed above, the two do not compete for sales
except from a limited number of consumers. The more well known
the designer, the greater the damages would be.' 6 If the trial court
found that the knockoff artist had acted with oppression, fraud, or
malice, punitive damages might also be awarded.69 Since the action
would be for the overall theft of the designer's public design identity,
there would be no need to request an injunction and meet the burden
of irreparable harm - the knockoff artist would be prevented from
further copying of the designer's traits by enforcement of the
judgment and through the Full Faith and Credit clause.
A designer's asserting his right of publicity would not preclude
the knockoff artist from making clothing, but would prevent the
knockoff from taking the designer's essence wholesale and profiting
from it. Nor would it preclude one of the time-honored traditions of
art: acknowledging the sources of one's creative inspiration while
turning the sources into something entirely new. It would truly
prevent creative identity theft.
Ill
Could It Work?
A number of potential obstacles to application of the right of
publicity present themselves. The first is the possible preemption by
federal intellectual property law. The Supreme Court has held that
the right of publicity in and of itself does not conflict with and is not
automatically preempted by federal intellectual property statutes. °
166. ABS is now a multi-million dollar company. ABS by Allen Schwartz, About Us
<http://www.absstyle.com/about> (accessed Apr. 23, 2001).
167. This was the measure used by the trial court and upheld on appeal in Waits, 978
F.2d at 1111.
168. "Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated, the
greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered." Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at
825 n. 11.
169. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111.
170. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (discussed supra at note 99).
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However, because the effect of application of the right to a designer's
signature traits would be to prevent outright copying of the designer's
garments, the Copyright, Patent, and Lanham Acts could be
implicated. The three main cases on the subject of intellectual
property preemption - Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,171
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 172 and Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. ,173 - have addressed state law protection of
intellectual property that has been specifically denied protection by
federal law.
In Sears and Compco, the items at issue were lamps, whose
designs were originated by the plaintiffs and patented, which were
copied and sold at a lower retail price by the defendants. 174 The trial
courts found the defendants liable under Illinois unfair competition
law.175 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the lamps
were unpatentable, they were in the public domain and the
defendants had a right to copy them.176 "To allow a State by use of its
law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit
the State to block off from the public something which federal law
has said belongs to the public. 1 77 States may require that patented or
unpatented goods be labeled to prevent customer confusion as to
source, but they may not prohibit copying of an unpatented or
uncopyrighted article or award damages for doing so. ' Bonito Boats
also dealt with a state statute granting patent-like protection, this
time a Florida unfair competition statute forbidding the duplication
of unpatented boat hulls. 179 The statute was held invalid under the
Supremacy Clause because, by granting what was essentially
perpetual patent protection, the state went beyond the balance
between a limited property right in an idea and the public's access to
knowledge struck by the federal patent scheme.1"
Taken together, Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats stand for the
171. 376 U.S. 225.
172. 376 U.S. 234 (following Sears, 376 U.S. 225).
173. 489 U.S. 141.
174. The patents in both cases were found to be invalid at the trial court level, and
the patents' validity was not at issue before the Supreme Court. Compco, 376 U.S. at 235;
Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
175. Compco, 376 U.S. at 236; Sears, 376 U.S. at 227.
176. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230.
177. Id. at 231-32.
178. Id. at 232-33.
179. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144.
180. Id. at 152.
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principle that ideas that are in the public domain must remain there,
and states may not "redirect inventive efforts away from the careful
criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200
years. 181 Protection of designs under state unfair competition laws is
limited only to the context where consumer confusion as to source is
likely to result from the copying of a product's nonfunctional aspects
that have acquired secondary meaning."8
Using the right of publicity to protect designers would not
necessarily raise preemption problems if the focus is on the
misappropriation of design services, and not the copying of specific
articles - although the misappropriation may take the form of an
exact copy of a designer's work, usually it takes the essential
elements and slightly alters their configuration, e.g., a change of color
or use of a lower quality fabric. The theft is of the expression of the
designer's personality, not of an idea, which was the cause of the
Supreme Court's careful guarding of the federal patent laws in Sears,
Compco, and Bonito Boats. Specifically, this expression is a
combination of design traits that, when viewed together, represent a
designer's identity. The knockoff artist would not be prevented from
making a garment that included one trait, but from using them in the
combination that signifies the original designer, just as the sound-
alikes in Midler and Waits were not allowed to imitate the singers'
voices in versions of the singers' own songs.
The protection granted to a designer's design traits by the right
of publicity would be similar to the protection granted Zacchini's
entire human cannonball act, for which the Supreme Court stated
other forms of intellectual property protection were inadequate."' If
the designer's design identity can be entirely appropriated by
someone else, there is no point in the designer's continuing to offer
her design services to the public. Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit
discussed in Waits, the Copyright Act does not preempt the state
right of publicity when the subject matter "does not come within the
subject matter of copyright."'' Like Bette Midler's and Tom Waits'
voices, clothing design traits are not subject matters of copyright.
181. Id. at 157.
182. Id. at 158.
183. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76 (discussed supra at note 99) (Defendant news
broadcasting company aired plaintiff's entire fifteen-second act, as filmed at a local
carnival, on its newscast. The airing was held not to be newsworthy and therefore
protectable by the First Amendment because it took away from the plaintiff the sale of
his performance services to the public; without the right of publicity the plaintiff would
have no means by which to recover against the broadcasting company.).
184. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (2001); Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
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Since the elements used to determine whether appropriation has
taken place.85 are "different in kind" from those used in a copyright
infringement case, federal copyright law would not preempt the
misappropriation claim."'
The second primary objection to the protection of haute couture
clothing under a right of publicity would be under antitrust law.
Protecting a designer's identity as embodied in clothing would
effectively grant the designer a monopoly over that specific
combination of traits that evokes his personality. Indeed, antitrust
concerns have traditionally been one of the reasons why the United
States has declined copyright protection to clothing - having a
limited number of protected designs on the market would limit
consumer choice and raise prices."7 However, the present scheme of
non-protection is already anti-competitive in that it serves as a
barrier to entry into the field of clothing design by new designers -
what is the point of being creative, innovative, and talented when
your work will be copied and your price undercut almost as soon as
you become popular?"8 The public's clothing style consumption
choices are circumscribed by having fewer competing designers from
which to choose and from seeing similar articles of clothing on sale
from different sources.
Granting protection to a designer's haute couture design identity
and integrity would not be anti-competitive, at least not more so than
the present situation. A grant of protection would create an incentive
for designers to come up with their own design identities. This, in
turn, would benefit consumers because there would be a wider array
of styles from which to choose. Also, it would allow designers to
expand their protected design traits into less expensive, pret-a-porter
lines. Consumers would then have increased access to previously
unaffordable designs by famous designers, at a low price, and whose
quality and originality will be assured.
IV
Conclusion
It is clear that fashion, no less than painting, sculpture, or music,
is art, and that its creators are as deserving of some legal protection
for their endeavors as painters, sculptors, composers, musicians, and
185. Supra nn. 92-115 and accompanying text.
186. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
187. See Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 866-67.
188. See supra n. 72.
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singers. For the United States to offer fashion design little protection
under its copyright, trademark/trade dress, and design patent laws is
ridiculous given that the United States' main export is arts and
entertainment. The United States is home to a multi-billion-dollar
fashion industry that is consistently put at a competitive disadvantage
in the world market for fashion by lawmakers who cannot get past
the idea that clothing is useful and nothing more. Moreover, these
lawmakers are ignoring their duties under the TRIPS Agreement and
Berne Convention, which promise national treatment to the creative
products of their members. While the United States demands
increased protection abroad for other types of intellectual property, it
ignores the demands of a huge creative industry at home. This bizarre
blindness towards the inherent artistry and creativity of high fashion
can no longer be ignored.
Where other forms of United States intellectual property law
have failed fashion, perhaps the right of publicity can compensate
and protect a designer's creative identities. A designer's services -
and the traits of a garment that consumers expect to indicate the
presence of said designer's services - would be recognized as
something unique and intimately connected to the designer, much
like a singer's voice is intimately and personally connected to her.
Because the right of publicity is a personal right, and existing federal
intellectual property law does not protect the subject matter of
fashion design, designers should be able to assert the right without
encountering preemption problems. Furthermore, protection of a
designer's design identity would increase competitiveness in the
fashion market by allowing more designers, each with different
identities, to enter the market and to expand into differently-priced
lines of clothing. The result would be more fashion choices for
consumers of a range of income levels.
Some who already oppose the right of publicity as a body of law
of dubious merit may consider its application to haute couture
fashion design to be a ridiculous expansion of an already ridiculous
"right." If so, there is an easy solution - amend the Copyright Act to
include protection for fashion works and put them into the existing
pantheon of Art that the United States deems worthy of fostering.
Assuage the anti-monopoly Jonahs by granting a very short term of
protection, such as a year. But above all, as citizens of a civilized
country that purports to nurture the arts, we must continue to
cultivate true creativity. Applying the right of publicity to designers
and their works would bless the fields of fashion with the affirmative
protection they deserve.
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